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Abstract.   The paper examines the possibility of a Turing test 
designed to answer the question of whether a computational 
artefact is a genuine subject of conscious experience. Even given 
the severe epistemological difficulties surrounding the 'other 
minds problem' in philosophy, we nonetheless generally believe 
that other human beings are conscious. Hence Turing attempts to 
defend his original test (2T) in terms of operational parity with 
the evidence at our disposal in the case of attributing 
understanding and consciousness to other humans. Following 
this same line of reasoning, I argue that the conversation-based 
2T is far too weak, and we must scale up to the full linguistic and 
robotic standards of the Total Turing Test (3T).  
 Within this framework, I deploy Block's distinction 
between Phenomenal-consciousness and Access-consciousness 
to argue that passing the 3T could at most provide a sufficient 
condition for concluding that the robot enjoys the latter but not 
the former. However, I then propose a variation on the 3T, 
adopting Dennett's method of 'heterophenomenology', to 
rigorously probe the robot's purported 'inner' qualitative 
experiences. If the robot could pass such a prolonged and 
intensive Qualia 3T (Q3T), then the purely behavioural evidence 
would seem to attain genuine parity with the human case. 
Although success at the Q3T would not supply definitive proof 
that the robot was genuinely a subject of Phenomenal-
consciousness, given that the external evidence is now 
equivalent with the human case, apparently the only grounds for 
denying qualia would be appeal to difference of internal 
structure, either physical-physiological or functional-
computational. In turn, both of these avenues are briefly 
examined.   1the  
1     INTRODUCTION 
According to the widely embraced ‘computational paradigm’, 
which underpins cognitive science, Strong AI and various allied 
positions in the philosophy of mind, computation (of one sort or 
another) is held to provide the scientific key to explaining 
mentality in general and, ultimately, to reproducing it artificially. 
The paradigm maintains that cognitive processes are essentially 
computational processes, and hence that intelligence in the 
natural world arises when a material system implements the 
appropriate kind of computational formalism. So this broadly 
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that the mental 
states, properties and contents sustained by human beings are 
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fundamentally computational in nature, and that computation, at 
least in principle, opens the possibility of creating artificial 
minds with comparable states, properties and contents.  
 Traditionally there are two basic features that are held 
to be essential to minds and which decisively distinguish mental 
from non-mental systems. One is representational content: 
mental states can be about external objects and states of affairs. 
The other is conscious experience: roughly and as a first 
approximation, there is something it is like to be a mind, to be a 
particular mental subject. As a case in point, there is something it 
is like for me to be consciously aware of typing this text into my 
desk top computer. Additionally, various states of my mind are 
concurrently directed towards a number of different external 
objects and states of affairs, such as the letters that appear on my 
monitor. In stark contrast, the table supporting my desk top 
computer is not a mental system: there are no states of the table 
that are properly about anything, and there is nothing it is like to 
be the table. 
 Just as it seems doubtful that the term ‘mind’ should 
be applied to a system with no representational states, so too, 
many would claim that a system entirely devoid of conscious 
experience cannot be a mind.  Hence if the project of Strong AI 
is to be successful at its ultimate goal of producing a system that 
truly counts as an artificially engendered locus of mentality, then 
it would seem necessary that this computational artefact be fully 
conscious in a manner comparable to human beings.  
 
2     CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINAL          
       TURING TEST   
In 1950 Turing [1] famously proposed an answer to the question 
‘Can (or could) a machine think?’ by replacing it with the more 
precise and empirically tractable question ‘Can (or could) a 
machine pass a certain type of test?’, which mode of assessment 
has since become universally referred to as the 'Turing test' (2T). 
In brief, (the standardized version of) Turing’s test is an 
‘imitation game’ involving three players: a computational 
artifact and two humans. One of the humans is the ‘judge’ and 
can pose questions to the remaining two players, where the goal 
of the game is for the questioner to determine which of the two 
respondents is the computer. If, after a set amount of time, the 
questioner guesses correctly, then the machine loses the game, 
and if the questioner is wrong then the machine wins. Turing 
claimed, as a basic theoretical point, that any machine that could 
win the game a suitable number of times has passed the test and 
should be judged to be intelligent, in the sense that its behavioral 
performance has been demonstrated to be indistinguishable from 
that of a human being. 
 In his prescient and ground breaking article, Turing 
explicitly considers the application of his test to the question of 
machine consciousness. This is in section (4) of the paper, where 
he considers the anticipated 'Argument from Consciousness' 
objection to the validity of his proposed standard for answering 
the question 'Can a machine think?'. The objection is that, as per 
the above, consciousness is a necessary precondition for genuine 
thinking and mentality, and that a machine might fool its 
interlocutor and pass the purely behavioural 2T, and yet remain 
completely devoid of internal conscious experience. Hence 
merely passing the 2T does not provide a sufficient condition for 
concluding that the system in question possesses the 
characteristics required for intelligence and bona fide thinking. 
Hence the 2T is inherently defective. 
 Turing's defensive strategy is to invoke the well known 
and severe epistemological difficulties surrounding the very 
same question regarding our fellow human beings. This is the 
notorious ‘other minds problem’ in philosophy – how do you 
know that other people actually have a conscious inner life like 
your own? Perhaps everyone else is a zombie and you’re the 
only conscious being in the universe. As Turing humorously 
notes, this type of 'solipsistic' view (although more accurately 
characterized as a form of other minds skepticism, rather than 
full blown solipsism), while logically impeccable, tends to make 
communication difficult, and rather than continually arguing 
over the point, it is usual to simply adopt the polite convention 
that everyone is conscious.  
 Turing notes that on its most extreme construal, the 
only way that one could be sure that a machine or another human 
being is conscious and hence genuinely thinking is to be the 
machine or the human and feel oneself thinking. In other words, 
one would have to gain first person access to what it's like to be 
the agent in question. And since this is not an empirical option, 
we can’t know with certainty whether any other system is 
conscious – all we have to go on is behaviour. Hence Turing 
attempts to justify his behavioural test that a machine can think, 
and ipso facto, has conscious experience, by claiming parity with 
the evidence at our disposal in the case of other humans. He 
therefore presents his anticipated objector with the following 
dichotomy: either be guilty of an inconsistency by accepting the 
behavioural standard in the case of humans but not computers, or 
maintain consistency by rejecting it in both cases and embracing 
solipsism. He concludes that most consistent proponents of the 
argument from consciousness would chose to abandon their 
objection and accept his test rather than be forced into the 
solipsistic position. 
 However, it is worth applying some critical scrutiny to 
Turing's reasoning at this early juncture.  Basically, he seems to 
be running epistemological issues together with semantical 
and/or factive questions which should properly be kept separate.  
It’s one thing to ask what we mean by saying that a system has a 
mind – i.e. what essential traits and properties are we ascribing 
to it with the use of the term; while it’s quite another thing to ask 
how we can know that a given system actually satisfies this 
meaning and hence really does have a mind. Turing’s 
behaviouristic methodology has a strong tendency to collapse 
these two themes, but it is important to note that they are 
conceptually distinct. In the argument from consciousness, the 
point is that we mean something substantive, something more 
than just verbal stimulus-response patterns, when we attribute 
mentality to a system. In this case the claim is that we mean that 
the system in question has conscious experience, and this 
property is required for any agent to be accurately described with 
the term ‘mind’. 
 So one could potentially hold that consciousness is 
essential to mentality (because that’s part of the core meaning of 
the term) and that: 
 (1) other human beings are in fact conscious  
 (2) the computer is in fact unconscious 
 (3) therefore, the computer doesn’t have a mind, even 
       though it passes the 2T. 
This could be the objective state of affairs that genuinely obtains 
in the world, and this is completely independent of whether we 
can know, with certainty, that premises (1) and (2) are actually 
true. Although epistemological and factive issues are intimately 
related and together inform our general practices and goals of 
inquiry, nonetheless we could still be correct in our assertion, 
without being able to prove it’s correctness. So if one thought 
that consciousness was essential to genuine mentality, then one 
could seemingly deny that any purely behaviouristic standard 
was sufficient to test for whether a system had or was a mind.  
 In the case of other human beings, we certainly take 
behaviour as evidence that they are conscious, but the evidence 
could in principle overwhelmingly support a false conclusion, in 
both directions. For example, someone could be in a comatose 
state where they could show no evidence of being conscious 
because they could make no bodily responses. But in itself this 
wouldn’t make them unconscious. They could still be cognizant 
of what was going on and perhaps be able to report, 
retrospectively, on past events once out of their coma. And 
again, maybe some people really are zombies, or sleepwalkers, 
and exhibit all the appropriate external signs of consciousness 
even though they’re really asleep or under some voodoo spell - 
it’s certainly a conceivable state of affairs which cannot simply 
be ruled out a priori.  
 Historically, there has been disagreement regarding the 
proper interpretation of Turing's position regarding the intended 
import of his test. Some have claimed that the 2T is proposed as 
an operational definition of intelligence, thinking, etc., (e.g. 
Block [2], French [3]), and as such it has immediate and 
fundamental faults. However, in the current discussion I will 
adopt a weaker reading and interpret the test as purporting to 
furnish an empirically specifiable criterion for when intelligence 
can be legitimately ascribed to an artefact. On this reading, the 
main role of behavior is inductive or evidential rather than 
constitutive, and so behavioral tests for mentality do not provide 
a necessary condition nor a reductive definition. At most, all that 
is warranted is a positive ascription of intelligence or mentality, 
if the test is adequate and the system passes. In the case of 
Turing's 1950 proposal, the adequacy of the test is defended 
almost entirely in terms of parity of input/output performance 
with human beings, and hence alleges to employ the same 
operational standards that we tacitly adopt when ascribing 
conscious thought processes to our fellow creatures.  
 Thus the issue would appear to hinge upon the degree 
of evidence a successful 2T performance provides for a positive 
conclusion in the case of a computational artefact, (i.e. for the 
negation of (2) above), and how this compares to the total body 
of evidence that we have in support of our belief in the truth of 
(1). We will only be guilty of an inconsistency or employing a 
double standard if the two are on a par and we nonetheless 
dogmatically still insist on the truth of both (1) and (2). But if it 
turns out to be the case that our evidence for (1) is significantly 
better than for the negation of (2), then we are not forced into 
Turing’s dichotomy. And in terms of the original 2T, I think 
there is clearly very little parity with the human case. We rely on 
far more than simply verbal behaviour in arriving at the polite 
convention that other human beings are conscious. In addition to 
conversational data, we lean very heavily on their bodily actions 
involving perception of the spatial environment, navigation, 
physical interaction, verbal and other modes of response to 
communally accessible non-verbal stimuli in the shared physical 
surroundings, etc. So the purely conversational standards of the 
2T are not nearly enough to support a claim of operational parity 
with humans. In light of the foregoing observations, in order to 
move towards evidential equivalence in terms of observable 
behaviour, it is necessary to break out of the closed syntactic 
bubble of the 2T and scale up to a full linguistic and robotic 
version of the test. But before exploring this vastly strengthened 
variation as a potential test for the presence of conscious 
experience in computational artefacts, in the next section I will 
briefly examine the notion of consciousness itself, since we first 
need to attain some clarification regarding the phenomenon in 
question, before we go looking for it in robots.    
3    TWO TYPES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Even in the familiar human case, consciousness is a notoriously 
elusive phenomenon, and is quite difficult to characterize 
rigorously. In addition, the word ‘consciousness’ is not used in a 
uniform and univocal manner, but rather appears to have 
different meanings in different contexts of use and across diverse 
academic communities. Block [4] provides a potentially 
illuminating philosophical analysis of the distinction and 
possible relationship between two common uses of the word. 
Block contends that consciousness is a ‘mongrel’ term connoting 
a number of different concepts and denoting a number of 
different phenomena. He attempts to clarify the issue by 
distinguishing two basic and distinct forms of consciousness that 
are often conflated: Phenomenal or P-consciousness and Access 
or A-consciousness. Very roughly, “Phenomenal consciousness 
is experience: what makes a state phenomenally conscious is that 
there is ‘something it’s like’ to be in that state”. Somewhat more 
controversially, Block holds that P-conscious properties, as such, 
are “distinct from any cognitive, intentional or functional 
property.” The notoriously difficult explanatory gap problem in 
philosophical theorizing concerns P-consciousness – e.g. how is 
it possible that appeal to a physical brain process could explain 
what it is like to see something as red?   
 So we must take care to distinguish this type of purely 
qualitative, Phenomenal consciousness, from Access 
consciousness, the latter of which Block sees as an information 
processing correlate of P-consciousness. A-consciousness states 
and structures are those which are directly available for control 
of speech, reasoning and action. Hence Block's rendition of A-
consciousness is similar to Baars' [5] notion that conscious 
representations are those that are broadcast in a global 
workspace. The functional/computational approach holds that 
the level of analysis relevant for understanding the mind is one 
that allows for multiple realization, so that in principle the same 
mental states and phenomena can occur in vastly different types 
of physical systems which implement the same abstract 
functional or computational structure. As a consequence, a 
staunch adherent of the functional-computational approach is 
committed to the view that the same conscious states must be 
preserved across widely diverse type of physical 
implementation. In contrast, a more ‘biological’ approach holds 
that details of the particular physical/physiological realization 
matter in the case of conscious states. Block says that if P = A, 
then the information processing side is right, while if the 
biological nature of experience is crucial then we can expect that 
P and A will diverge.  
 A crude difference between the two in terms of overall 
characterization is that P-consciousness content is qualitative 
while A-consciousness content is representational. A-conscious 
states are necessarily transitive or intentionally directed, they are 
always states of consciousness of. However. P-conscious states 
don’t have to be transitive. On Block's account, the paradigm P-
conscious states are the qualia associated with sensations, while 
the paradigm A-conscious states are propositional attitudes. He 
maintains that the A-type is nonetheless a genuine form of 
consciousness, and tends to be what people in cognitive 
neuroscience have in mind, while philosophers are traditionally 
more concerned with qualia and P-consciousness, as in the hard 
problem and the explanatory gap. In turn, this difference in 
meaning can lead to mutual misunderstanding. In the following 
discussion I will examine the consequences of the distinction 
between these two types of consciousness on the prospects of a 
Turing test for consciousness in artefacts.   
4     THE TOTAL TURING TEST  
In order to attain operational parity with the evidence at our 
command in the case of human beings, a Turing test for even 
basic linguistic understanding and intelligence, let alone 
conscious experience, must go far beyond Turing's original 
proposal. The conversational 2T relies solely on verbal 
input/output patterns, and these alone are not sufficient to evince 
a correct interpretation of the manipulated strings. Language is 
primarily about extra-linguistic entities and states of affairs, and 
there is nothing in a cunningly designed program for pure syntax 
manipulation which allows it to break free of this closed loop of 
symbols and demonstrate a proper correlation between word and 
object. When it comes to judging human language users in 
normal contexts, we rely on a far richer domain of evidence.  
Even when the primary focus of investigation is language 
proficiency and comprehension, sheer linguistic input/output 
data is not enough. Turing's original test is not a sufficient 
condition for concluding that the computer genuinely 
understands or refers to anything with the strings of symbols it 
produces, because the computer doesn’t have the right sort of 
relations and interactions with the objects and states of affairs in 
the real world that its words are supposed to be about.  To 
illustrate the point; if the computer has no eyes, no hands, no 
mouth, and has never seen or eaten anything, then it is not 
talking about hamburgers when its program generates the string 
of English symbols ‘h-a-m-b-u-r-g-e-r-s’ – it’s merely operating 
inside a closed loop of syntax. 
 In sharp contrast, our talk of hamburgers is intimately 
connected to nonverbal transactions with the objects of 
reference. There are ‘language entry rules’ taking us from 
nonverbal stimuli to appropriate linguistic behaviours. When 
given the visual stimulus of being presented with a pizza, a taco 
and a kebab, we can produce the salient utterance "Those 
particular foodstuffs are not hamburgers". And there are 
‘language exit rules’ taking us from linguistic expressions to 
appropriate nonverbal actions. For example, we can follow 
complex verbal instructions and produce the indicated patterns 
of behaviour, such as finding the nearest Burger King on the 
basis of a description of its location in spoken English. Mastery 
of both of these types of rules is essential for deeming that a 
human agent understands natural language and is using 
expressions in a correct and referential manner - and the hapless 
2T computer lacks both.2   2the  
 And when it comes to testing for conscious experience, 
we again need these basic additional dimensions of perception 
and action in the real world as an essential precondition. The 
fundamental limitations of mere conversational performance 
naturally suggest a strengthening of the 2T, later named the Total 
Turing Test (3T) by Harnad [7], wherein the repertoire of 
relevant behaviour is expanded to include the full range of 
intelligent human activities. This will require that the 
computational procedures respond to and control not simply a 
teletype system for written inputs and outputs, but rather a well 
crafted artificial body. Thus in the 3T the scrutinized artefact is a 
robot, and the data to be tested coincide with the full spectrum of 
behaviours of which human beings are normally capable. In 
order to succeed, the 3T candidate must be able to do, in the real 
world of objects and people, everything that intelligent people 
can do. Thus Harnad expresses a widely held view when he 
claims that the 3T is "...no less (nor more) exacting a test of 
having a mind than the means we already use with one another... 
[and, echoing Turing] there is no stronger test, short of being the 
candidate". And, as noted above, the latter state of affairs is not 
an empirical option. examined.3   3the  
 Since the 3T requires the ability to perceive and act in 
the real world, and since A-consciousness states and structures 
are those which are directly available for control of speech, 
reasoning and action, it would seem to follow that the successful 
3T robot must be A-conscious. For example, in order to pass the 
test, the robot would have to behave in an appropriate manner in 
any number of different scenarios such as the following. The 
robot is handed a silver platter on which a banana, a boiled egg, 
a teapot and a hamburger are laid out. The robot is asked to pick 
up the piece of fruit and throw it out the window. Clearly the 
robot could not perform the indicated action unless it had direct 
information processing access to the identity of the salient 
object, its spatial location, the movements of its own mechanical 
arm, the location and geometrical properties of the window, etc. 
Such transitive, intentionally directed A-conscious states are 
plainly required for the robot to pass the test. 
 But does it follow that the successful 3T robot is P-
conscious? It seems, not, since on the face of it there appears to 
be no reason why the robot could not pass the test relying on A-
consciousness alone. All that is being tested is its executive 
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control of the cognitive processes enabling it to reason correctly 
and perform appropriate verbal and bodily actions in response to 
a myriad of linguistic and perceptual inputs. These abilities are 
demonstrated solely through its external behaviour, and so far, 
there seems to be no reason for P-conscious states to be invoked. 
Since the 3T is primarily intended to test the robot’s overall 
intelligence and linguistic understanding in the actual world, the 
A-conscious robot could conceivably pass the 3T while at the 
same time there is nothing it is like to be the 3T robot passing the 
test. We are now bordering on issues involved in demarcating 
the 'easy' from the 'hard' problems of consciousness, which, if 
pursued at this point, would be moving in a direction not 
immediately relevant to the topic at hand. So rather than 
exploring arguments relating to this deeper theme, I will simply 
contend that passing the 3T provides a sufficient condition for 
Block's version of A-consciousness, but not for P-consciousness, 
since it could presumably be passed by an artefact devoid of 
qualia.  
 Many critics of Block's basic type of view (including 
Searle [9] and Burge [10]) argue that if there can be such 
functional ‘zombies’ that are A-conscious but not P-conscious, 
then they are not genuinely conscious at all. Instead, A-
consciousness is better characterized as a type of ‘awareness’, 
and is a form of consciousness only to the extent that it is 
parasitic upon P-conscious states. So we could potentially have a 
3T for A-consciousness, but then the pivotal question arises, is 
A-consciousness without associated qualitative presentations 
really a form of consciousness? Again, I will not delve into this 
deeper and controversial issue in the present discussion, but 
simply maintain that the successful 3T robot does at least exhibit 
the type of A-awareness that people in, e.g., cognitive 
neuroscience tend to call consciousness. But as stated earlier, 
'consciousness' is a multifaceted term, and there are also good 
reasons for not calling mere A-awareness without qualia a full-
fledged form of consciousness. 
 For example, someone who was drugged or talking in 
their sleep could conceivably pass the 2T while still 
'unconscious', that is A-'conscious' but not P-conscious. And a 
human sleep walker might even be able to pass the verbal and 
robotic 3T while 'unconscious' (again A-'conscious' but not P-
conscious). What this seems to indicate is that only A-
'consciousness' can be positively ascertained by behaviour. But 
there is an element of definitiveness here, since it seems 
plausible to say that an agent could not pass the 3T without 
being A-'conscious', at least in the minimal sense of A-
awareness. If the robot were warned 'mind the banana peel' and it 
was not A-aware of the treacherous object in question on the 
ground before it, emitting the frequencies of electromagnetic 
radiation appropriate for 'banana-yellow', then it would not 
deliberately step over the object, but rather would slip and fall 
and fail the test.   
5     A TOTAL TURING TEST FOR QUALIA 
In the remainder of the paper I will not pursue the controversial 
issue as to whether associated P-consciousness is a necessary 
condition for concluding that the A-awareness of the successful 
3T robot is genuinely a form of consciousness at all.  Instead, I 
will explore an intensification of the standard 3T intended to 
prod more rigorously for evidential support of the presence of P-
conscious states. This Total Turing Test for qualia (Q3T) is a 
more focused scrutiny of the successful 3T robot which 
emphasizes rigorous and extended verbal and descriptive 
probing into the qualitative aspects of the robot's purported 
internal experiences. So the Q3T involves unremitting 
questioning and verbal analysis of the robot's qualitative inner 
experiences, in reaction to a virtually limitless variety of salient 
external stimuli, such as paintings, sunsets, musical 
performances, tastes, textures, smells, pleasures and pains, 
emotive reactions...   
 Turing suggests a precursor version of this strategy in 
his 1950 discussion of the argument from consciousness, where 
he observes that the question of machine consciousness could be 
addressed by a sustained viva voce, where the artefact was asked 
questions directly concerning its aesthetic and other types of 
qualitative reactions and judgement in response to opened-ended 
questioning by the interrogator. Turing provides a conjectural 
illustration of the method in the guise of a 'sonnet writing' 
programme being quizzed by a human judge. 
 
 Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which 
 reads "Shall I compare thee to a summer's day," would 
 not "a spring day" do as well or better? 
 
 Witness: It wouldn't scan. 
 
 Interrogator: How about "a winter's day," that would 
 scan all right. 
 
 Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a 
 winter's day. 
 
 Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded 
 you of Christmas?  
 
 Witness: In a way. 
 
 Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day,  and I do 
 not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison. 
 
 Witness: I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day 
 one means a typical winter's day, rather than a special 
 one like Christmas. 
 
 And so on.... 
 
The above sample dialogue serves as a good reminder of just 
how difficult the original 2T really is (and consequently why it 
hasn't yet been passed). However, this conjectured scenario is 
still confined to a merely conversational setting of verbal inputs 
and verbal outputs, and hence falls far short of the behavioural 
potential of a full 3T edition, as well as the concomitant 
evidential standards applicable in the human case.     
 Plebe and Perconti [11] put forward a strengthened 
adaptation of a 2T-style viva voce, where the pivotal difference 
is that, in addition to merely linguistic inputs, the computer must 
now give appropriate and testable conversational reactions to 
uploaded images. This is an interesting and important 
augmentation of the original 2T, since the inputs are no longer 
strictly linguistic, and the test is aimed at evaluating verbally 
plausible responses to stimuli that, to us at least, have a 
phenomenal aspect.  As an example of the method, Plebe and 
Perconti supply an excerpt from a hypothetical conversation. 
 
 Interrogator: Do you want to look at a picture of me? 
 
 Machine: Oh yes, thanks, let's upload that. 
                                  <.... uploading> 
  
 Machine: Mmmh, I see several people here, who are 
 you? 
 
 Interrogator: Try to guess. 
 
 Machine: Well, I know you are blond and shy, so I 
 would guess the second from the left. 
 
 This appears to be an order of magnitude jump over 
the purely verbal 2T, and accordingly its standards of 
satisfaction are even more futuristic. However, in terms of the 
ultimate goal of providing a test, the passing of which constitutes 
a sufficient condition for the presence of genuine conscious 
experience in an artefact, it should be noted that the inputs, at a 
crucial level of analysis, remain purely syntactic and non-
qualitative, in that the uploaded image must take the form of a 
digital file. Hence this could at most provide evidence of some 
sort of (proto) A-awareness in terms of salient data extraction 
and attendant linguistic conversion from a digital source, where 
the phenomenal aspects produced in humans by the original (pre-
digitalized) image are systematically corroborated by the 
computer's linguistic outputs when responding to the inputted 
code.    
 Although a major step forward in terms of expanding 
the input repertoire under investigation, as well as possessing the 
virtue of being closer to the limits of practicality in the nearer 
term future, this proposed new qualia 2T still falls short of the 
full linguistic and robotic Q3T. In particular it tests, in a 
relatively limited manner, only one sensory modality, and in 
principle there is no reason why this method of scrutiny should 
be restricted to the intake of photographic images represented in 
digital form. Hence a natural progression would be to test a 
computer on uploaded audio files as well. However, this 
expanded 2T format is still essentially passive in nature, where 
the neat and tidy uploaded files are hand fed into the computer 
by the human interrogator, and the outputs are confined to mere 
verbal response. Active perception of and reaction to distal 
objects in the real world arena are critically absent from this test, 
and so it fails to provide anything like evidential parity with the 
human case. And given the fact that the selected non-linguistic 
inputs take the form of digitalized representations of possible 
visual (and/or auditory) stimuli, there is still no reason to think 
that there is anything it is like to be the 2T computer processing 
the uploaded encoding of an image of, say, a vivid red rose. 
 But elevated to a full 3T arena of shared external 
stimuli and attendant discussion and analysis, the positive 
evidence of a victorious computational artefact would become 
exceptionally strong indeed. So the extended Q3T is based on a 
methodology akin to Dennett's [12] 'heterophenomenology' - 
given the robot's presumed success at the standard Total Turing 
Test, we count this as behavioural evidence sufficient to warrant 
the application of the intentional stance, wherein the robot is 
treated as a rational agent harbouring beliefs, desires and various 
other mental states exhibiting intentionality, and who's actions 
can be explained and predicted on the basis of the content of 
these states. Accordingly, the robot's salient sonic emissions are 
interpreted as natural language utterances asserting various 
propositions and expressing assorted contents. For the reasons 
delineated above in section 4, I would argue that this interpretive 
step and application of the intentional stance to a mere artefact is 
not evidentially warranted in a limited 2T type of setting, and 
hence in the latter case, the syntactic tokens emitted by the 
computer cannot be given the semantic value that we would 
attribute to utterances produced by our fellow human beings.        
 However, following Dennett, the gathering of 
scientifically rigorous empirical evidence proceeds with 
neutrality regarding the possible conscious experience of the 
robot. In this extended Q3T context, the artefact is queried not 
about uploaded images as 'qualitative' input data, but rather 
about its own subjective reactions and attendant introspective 
states. The robot is not hand fed selected digital files, but rather 
is presented with the same external stimuli as its human 
interlocutor, the latter of whom can then interrogate the robot 
regarding its purported qualitative experiences in response to the 
shared stimuli. Hence the human and the robot can both observe 
the same Dürer and the same Dali paintings, listen to the same 
Vivaldi and Schubert concertos, attend the same wine tasting 
event, eat the same brand of hamburger... And the robot must 
discourse on its subjective impressions and reactions like a true 
aesthete, and where this discourse can be calibrated by the 
human with respect to the latter’s own qualitative reactions.  
 As an example of the method, an excerpt from a 
hypothetical Q3T interaction might look something like the 
following. 
 
 Interrogator: Isn't the sunset over the Pacific 
 magnificent? 
 
 Robot: Yes, the colours are sublime. Let's go to the top 
 of that rise for a better view...   
 Excellent, now we have the full panorama. 
 
 Interrogator: What impression does it make on you? 
 
 Robot: As the glowing orange orb of the sun begins to 
 touch the calm blue line of the horizon, yet another day 
 is passing. Now the radiant disc begins to sink into the 
 sea and the background crimson intensifies and grows 
 warmer. It gives me a feeling of sadness, but at the 
 same time a glimpse of ineffable beauty...  
 Ouch!! Why the hell did you pinch me? 
 
 Interrogator: Just wanted to bring you back down to 
 earth - you were starting to wax a bit too lyrical. 
 
 Robot: Thanks very much for your concern. Could you 
 please pass me the bottle of delicious chilled 
 Chardonnay - I want to savour another glass along 
 with the last rays of the setting sun. 
 
 Interrogator: Here you go. 
 
 Robot: Arrrgh, that tastes disgusting! - what happened 
 to the wine?  
  
 Interrogator: Uhh, I just stirred in a little marmite 
 when you weren't looking - wanted to see how you'd 
 react. This is a Q3T, after all... 
  
Even though a merely A-conscious robot could conceivably pass 
the verbal and robotic 3T while at the same time as there being 
nothing it is like for the robot passing the test, in this more 
focussed version of the 3T the robot would at least have to be 
able to go on at endless length talking about what it's like. And 
this talk must be in response to an open ended range of different 
combinations of sensory inputs, which are shared and monitored 
by the human judge. Such a test would be both subtle and 
extremely demanding, and it would be nothing short of 
remarkable if it could not detect a fake. And presumably a 
human sleepwalker who could pass a normal 3T as above would 
nonetheless fail this type of penetrating Q3T (or else wake up in 
the middle!), and it would be precisely on the grounds of such 
failure that we would infer that the human was actually asleep 
and not genuinely P-conscious of what was going on.   
 If sufficiently rigorous and extended, this would 
provide extremely powerful inductive evidence, and indeed to 
pass the Q3T the robot would have to attain full evidential parity 
with the human case, in terms of externally manifested 
behaviour. 
6     BEYOND BEHAVIOUR 
So on what grounds might one consistently deny qualitative 
states and P-consciousness in the case of the successful Q3T 
robot and yet grant it in the case of a behaviourally 
indistinguishable human?  The two most plausible considerations 
that suggest themselves are both based on an appeal to essential 
differences of internal structure, either physical/physiological or 
functional/computational. Concerning the latter case, many 
versions of CTM focus solely on the functional analysis of 
propositional attitude states such as belief and desire, and simply 
ignore other aspects of the mind, most notably consciousness 
and qualitative experience. However others, such as Lycan [13], 
try to extend the reach of Strong AI and the computational 
paradigm, and contend that conscious states arise via the 
implementation of the appropriate computational formalism. Let 
us denote this extension of the basic CTM framework to the 
explanation of conscious experience ‘CTM+’. And a specialized 
version of CTM+ might hold that qualitative experiences arise in 
virtue of the particular functional and information processing 
structure of the human brand of cognitive architecture, and hence 
that, even though the robot is indistinguishable in terms of 
input/output profiles, nonetheless its internal processing structure 
is sufficiently different from ours to block the inference to P-
consciousness. So the non-identity of abstract functional or 
computational structure might be taken to undermine the claim 
that bare behavioural equivalence provides a sufficient condition 
for the presence of internal conscious phenomena.   
 At this juncture, the proponent of artificial 
consciousness might appeal to a version of Van Gulick’s [14] 
defense of functionalism against assorted ‘missing qualia’ 
objections. When aimed against functionalism, the missing 
qualia arguments generally assume a deviant realization of the 
very same abstract computational procedures underlying human 
mental phenomena, in a world that’s nomologically the same as 
ours in all respects, and the position being supported is that 
consciousness is to be equated with states of the biological brain, 
rather than with any arbitrary physical state playing the same 
functional role as a conscious brain process. For example, in 
Block's [15] well known 'Chinese Nation' scenario, we are asked 
to imagine a case where each person in China plays the role of a 
neuron in the human brain and for some (rather brief) span of 
time the entire nation cooperates to implement the same 
computational procedures as a conscious human brain. The 
rather compelling 'common sense' conclusion is that even though 
the entire Chinese population may implement the same 
computational structure as a conscious brain, there are 
nonetheless no purely qualitative conscious states in this 
scenario outside the conscious Chinese individuals involved. 
And this is then taken as a counterexample to purely 
functionalist theories of consciousness. 
 Van Gulick’s particular counter-strategy is to claim 
that the missing qualia argument begs the question at issue. How 
do we know, a priori, that the very same functional role could be 
played by arbitrary physical states that were unconscious? The 
anti-functionalist seems to beg the question by assuming that 
such deviant realizations are possible in the first place. At this 
point, the burden of proof may then rest on the functionalist to 
try and establish that there are in fact functional roles in the 
human cognitive system that could only be filled by conscious 
processing states. Indeed, this strategy seems more interesting 
than the more dogmatic functionalist line that isomorphism of 
abstract functional role alone guarantees the consciousness of 
any physical state that happens to implement it. 
 So to pursue this strategy, Van Gulick examines the 
psychological roles played by phenomenal states in humans and 
identifies various cognitive abilities which seem to require both 
conscious and self-conscious awareness – e.g. abilities which 
involve reflexive and meta-cognitive levels of representation. 
These include things like planning a future course of action, 
control of plan execution, acquiring new non-habitual task 
behaviours. These and related features of human psychological 
organization seem to require a conscious self-model. In this 
manner, conscious experience appears to play a unique 
functional role in broadcasting ‘semantically transparent’ 
information throughout the brain. In turn, the proponent of 
artificial consciousness might plausibly claim that the successful 
Q3T robot must possesses analogous processing structures in 
order to evince the equivalent behavioural profiles when passing 
the test. So even though the processing structure might not be 
identical to that of human cognitive architecture, it must 
nonetheless have the same basic cognitive abilities as humans in 
order to pass the Q3T, and if these processing roles in humans 
require phenomenal states, then the robot must enjoy them as 
well. 
 However, it is relevant to note that Van Gulick's 
analysis seems to blur Block's distinction between P-
consciousness and A-consciousness, and an obvious rejoinder at 
this point would be that all of the above processing roles in both 
humans and robots could in principle take place with only the 
latter and not the former. Even meta-cognitive and 'conscious' 
self models could be accounted for merely in terms of A-
awareness.  And this brings us back to the same claim as in the 
standard 3T scenario - that even the success of the Q3T robot 
could conceivably be explained without invoking P-
consciousness per se, and so it still fails as a sufficient condition 
for attributing full blown qualia to computational artefacts.  
7     MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Hence functional/computational considerations seem too weak to 
ground a positive conclusion, and this naturally leads to the 
question of the physical/physiological status of qualia. If even 
meta-cognitive and 'conscious' self models in humans could in 
principle be accounted for merely in terms of A-awareness, then 
how and why do humans have purely qualitative experience? 
One possible answer could be that P-conscious states are 
essentially physically based phenomena, and hence result from 
or supervene upon the particular structure and causal powers of 
the actual central nervous system. And this perspective is re-
enforced by what I would argue (on the following independent 
grounds) is the fundamental inability of abstract functional role 
to provide an adequate theoretical foundation for qualitative 
experience. 
 Unlike computational formalisms, conscious states are 
inherently non-abstract; they are actual, occurrent phenomena 
extended in physical time. Given multiple realizability as a 
hallmark of the theory, CTM+ is committed to the result that 
qualitatively identical conscious states are maintained across 
widely different kinds of physical realization. And this is 
tantamount to the claim that an actual, substantive and invariant 
qualitative phenomenon is preserved over radically diverse real 
systems, while at the same time, no internal physical regularities 
need to be preserved. But then there is no actual, occurrent factor 
which could serve as the causal substrate or supervenience base 
for the substantive and invariant phenomenon of internal 
conscious experience. The advocate of CTM+ cannot rejoin that 
it is formal role which supplies this basis, since formal role is 
abstract, and such abstract features can only be instantiated via 
actual properties, but they do not have the power to produce 
them.  
 The only (possible) non-abstract effects that 
instantiated formalisms are required to preserve must be 
specified in terms of their input/output profiles, and thus internal 
experiences, qua actual events, are in principle omitted. So (as 
I've also been argued elsewhere: see Schweizer [16,17]) it would 
appear that the non-abstract, occurrent nature of conscious states 
entails that they must depend upon intrinsic properties of the 
brain as a proper subsystem of the actual world (on the crucial 
assumption of physicalism as one's basic metaphysical stance - 
obviously other choices, such as some variety of dualism, are 
theoretical alternatives). It is worth noting that from this it does 
not follow that other types of physical subsystem could not share 
the relevant intrinsic properties and hence also support conscious 
states. It only follows that they would have this power in virtue 
of their intrinsic physical properties and not in virtue of being 
interpretable as implementing the same abstract computational 
procedure. 
8     CONCLUSION 
We know by direct first person access that the human central 
nervous system is capable of sustaining the rich and varied field 
of qualitative presentations associated with our normal cognitive 
activities. And it certainly seems as if these presentations play a 
vital role in our mental lives. However, given the above critical 
observation regarding Van Gulick's position, viz., that all of the 
salient processing roles in both humans and robots could in 
principle take place strictly in terms of A-awareness without P-
consciousness, it seems that P-conscious states are not actually 
necessary for explaining observable human behaviour and the 
attendant cognitive processes. In this respect, qualia are rendered 
functionally epiphenomenal, since purely qualitative states per se 
are not strictly required for a functional/computational account 
of human mentality. However, this is not to say that they are 
physically epiphenomenal as well, since it doesn't thereby follow 
that this aspect of physical/physiological structure does not in 
fact play a causal role in the particular human implementation of 
this functional cognitive architecture. Hence it becomes a purely 
contingent truth that humans have associated P-conscious 
experience. 
 And this should not be too surprising a conclusion, on 
the view that the human mind is the product of a long course of 
exceedingly happenstance biological evolution. On such a view, 
perhaps natural selection has simply recruited this available 
biological resource to play vital functional roles, which in 
principle could have instead been played by P-unconscious but 
A-aware states in a different type of realization. And in this case, 
P-conscious states in humans are thus a form of  'phenomenal 
overkill', and nature has simply been an opportunist in exploiting 
biological vehicles that happened to be on hand, to play a role 
that could have been played by a more streamlined and less rich 
type of state, but where a 'cheaper' alternative was simply not 
available at the critical point in time. Evolution and natural 
selection are severely curtailed in this respect, since the basic 
ingredients and materials available to work with are a result of 
random mutation on existing precursor structures present in the 
organism(s) in question. And perhaps human computer scientists 
and engineers, not limited by what happens to get thrown up by 
random genetic mutations, have designed the successful Q3T 
robot utilizing a cheaper, artificial alternative to the overly rich 
biological structures sustained in humans.  
 So in the case of the robot, it would remain an open 
question whether or not the physical substrate underlying the 
artefact's cognitive processes had the requisite causal powers or 
intrinsic natural characteristics to sustain P-conscious states. 
Mere behavioural evidence on its own would not be sufficient to 
adjudicate, and an independent standard or criterion would be 
required.4  4So if P-conscious states are thought to be essentially 
physically based, for the reasons given above, and if the robot's 
Q3T success could in principle be explained through appeal to 
mere A-aware stets on their own, then it follows that the non-
identity of the artefact's physical structure would allow one to 
                                                 
4
 This highlights one of the intrinsic limitations of the Turing test       
approach to such questions, since the test is designed as an imitation 
game, and humans are the ersatz target. Hence the Q3T robot is designed 
to behave as if it had subjective, qualitative inner experiences 
indistinguishable from those of a human. However, if human qualia are 
the products of our particular internal structure (either physical-
physiological or functional-computational), and if the robot is 
significantly different in this respect, then the possibility is open that the 
robot might be P-conscious and yet fail the test, simply because its 
resulting qualitative experiences are significantly different than ours. 
And indeed, a possibility in the reverse direction is that the robot might 
even pass the test and sustain an entirely different phenomenology, but 
where this internal difference is not manifested in its external behaviour.  
consistently extend Turing's polite convention to one's 
conspecifics and yet withhold it from the Q3T robot.   
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